Today’s youngest generation, known colloquially as “Generation Z,” has never known a life without technology. While demographers might disagree on when this generation actually began, marketers and trend forecasters characterize this group as those who were born during the fifteen year span from 1996 through 2011. Since the first generation of iPhones hit the market in 2007, “Generation Z is the first generation to be raised in the era of smartphones,” and many from this generation “do not remember a time before social media.” If Generation Y has been described as being “constantly plugged into technology,” then the next generation, where the average age for cell phone usage is six years old, is only more comfortable in the digital world. The newer generations of smartphones have the capability to take, send, and receive photographs, and open up a new realm of dangers for unwary users. Given that these devices are taken for granted, does Generation Z actually appreciate the risks associated with their picture taking and information sharing? The unfortunate answer is very little, if at all.
This polemical Essay explores the mutating nature of academic law libraries and the roles of their librarians and directors. It addresses several representative arguments debating the viability of academic law libraries, and, in the end, concludes that they will survive, albeit in diminished form and status. Law libraries will continue to provide an impressive array of vital services, including formal Legal Research instruction, establishing Legal Research Clinics and other clinical support, and even generating a revenue stream via grantsmanship and vibrant connection to the alumni and donor bases. It is possible to create models of sustainability for academic law libraries if innovation is permitted to prevail. While libraries and librarians, then, will survive (if not thrive), the prognosis for academic Law Library Directors as we now know them is somewhat more dire. Economic crises and changing law school administration can lead to significant erosion of law library directors’ authority and status. The Author argues that this is a dangerous development, but it may well represent the fate of academic law libraries Much is contingent upon the ABA, which is also subject to market forces akin to those shaping law schools. Ultimately, in this opinion piece predicated upon her extensive experience in law libraries, the Author proposes a new form of consistent ABA oversight of law libraries in conjunction with the AALL (American Association of Law Libraries) leadership serving in an ombudsman capacity, so that academic law libraries might yet evolve in a manner commensurate with their potential to advance legal education.
Over the past decade Crowdfunding has become increasingly popular within the U.S. Crowdfunding originally was used as a way for performing artists to raise funds for their projects. Most recently, it has been used to fund projects outside of the entertainment industry. Businesses and local governments have been using this method to raise capital. Crowdfunding websites such as Indiegogo, Kickstarter, and Crowdfunder have made it easier for individuals, particularly entrepreneurs, to access capital.
The JOBS Act amended the Securities Act of 1933, and mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgate rules that govern the eligibility and use of Crowdfunding. The SEC in 2011 and 2012 released proposed rules that would govern the Crowdfunding exemption, which eases regulation for small businesses. Critics have said that the JOBS Act and the SEC rules are both too liberal and too restrictive.
This note will discuss the SEC rules that are set to go into effect in May of 2016, and their potential effects on small business growth and investor protection. In particular, this note will highlight the potential conflict that will arise between the goal of the JOBS Act and the implementation of the SEC rules governing crowdfunding. This article will suggest that the SEC rules will only hinder the growth of small businesses instead of helping them raise capital.
As global commerce continues to expand, the volume of cross-border disputes regarding commercial and intellectual property disputes has increased substantially. Contract, business and intellectual property disputes are protected by laws which might vary from region to region. The question naturally arises as to the proper forum to handle international litigation between parties located in different countries and across cultural divides. Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) allows interested parties to explore options, beyond traditional judicial intervention, to handle global commercial and intellectual property disputes.
This article provides an overview of the benefits of ADR to international intellectual property and commercial disputes, and argues that ADR and the support of world intellectual property organizations offers a proper medium to address the unique substantive and procedural issues of international litigation.
Supplemental needs trusts of the pooled trust variety have offered important dignity-enhancing protections for individuals with disabilities for several decades. A pooled trust, properly structured according to Congressional requirements, allows the wealth of an individual with disabilities to be overseen by an independent third party trustee, supplementing without displacing means-tested government programs like Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income. Beginning in 2012, the Social Security Administration imposed new burdensome requirements on pooled trusts through its informal POMS manual. Those new requirements have intentionally or unintentionally eliminated as a practical matter the availability of pooled trusts in many states. This unfortunate result can be paralleled with recent observations about the shortcomings of supplemental needs trust legislation and regulations in the People’s Republic of China.
In this Essay, I argue that the existing approach to preemption (especially in the environmental context) is flawed because it invites the kind of statutory interpretation that relies heavily on the use of legislative history. Of course, legislative history is not always an improper tool of interpretation. But when it is used, for example, to glean congressional intent to preempt state law, the costs to sound interpretation and institutional credibility are too high. To counter that risk, I propose that the Court replace its current preemption analysis for Professor Caleb Nelson’s more versatile “logical contradiction” test (which in any event is more textually faithful to the Supremacy Clause). Relevant to my thesis, Professor Nelson’s approach would stymie the use of legislative history in preemption cases, and would motivate courts to engage in a fair, textual examination of the federal and state laws that are at odds with each other.
About 25 years ago, the Supreme Court, through its endorsement of the fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) theory in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, paved the way for modern securities-fraud litigation as we know it. That establishment, which effectively represents the principal way through which shareholders can sue companies for securities fraud, however, was on the brink of destruction in the recent Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II) case. Despite years of mounting and, seemingly, never-ending criticism, academic, popular, and otherwise, to the underpinnings of Basic’s FOTM theory, the Halliburton II Court adhered to its precedent. Criticism of FOTM should now be a moot point. Given the historical background of the securities laws, and the current tension between the increase in both the federal enforcement of those laws and corporate compliance efforts, the Supreme Court’s decision should not have been surprising.
E-commenting, or commenting on administrative rules and notices on-line, has transformed the federal notice-and-comment practice. With a click of a button, citizens can easily share their thoughts on a proposed rule or notice. While the goal of increasing the opportunity for public participation is a worthy one, expanded public commenting has turned the notice-and-comment process into a “rulemaking arms race.” Agencies are now inundated with voluminous comments as public interest groups encourage members to submit boilerplate comments.
The present paper is devoted to a critical examination of two of the publications of Ronald Coase (1960, 1974). But, before I begin my criticism, I should like to put into some sort of context the tremendous contribution to our discipline made by this man.
So far, since the Nobel Prize in economics was inaugurated in 1969, almost four score winners have been thus anointed. Needless to say, Coase is amongst that number. Thus, if this were all there were to his acknowledged contribution, his reputation would be secure, and, presumably, for all time, or, for at least as long as there are people who appreciate economics.
This Article is offered in tribute to civil rights legends Leon Higginbotham, Spottswood Robinson, and David Rabinovitz whose judicial recess appointments were invalidated by National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning. It also honors President Lyndon Johnson, who made the bold decision within just six weeks of inheriting the Oval Office, to force racial and religious integration of the federal judiciary by signing the recess commissions. The appointments, made in January 1964 during an eight day intercession recess of the 88th Senate, were President Johnson’s initial salvo in a hard-fought battle that resulted in historic advances in both civil rights and economic justice. The recess appointments were the earliest manifestation of LBJ’s political will and unparalleled political skill that would soon force the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Economic Opportunity Act, Head Start, Medicare, and Medicaid. President Johnson’s January 1964 integration of the three district courts signaled the coming appointment of Thurgood Marshall first as U.S. Solicitor General, and then as the first African-American on the U.S. Supreme Court.