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	<title>The Rutgers Law Record</title>
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			<title>“Using Persons” and the Justification of Punishment</title>
			<link>http://lawrecord.com/?p=480</link>
			<pubDate>Thu Jun 18 17:29:16 2026 / +0000  GMT</pubDate>
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			<content-encoded><![CDATA[<span style="font-variant:small-caps;color: #666666;">38 Rutgers L. Rec. 112 (2011)</span> | <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?cite=38+Rutgers+L.+Rec.+112&FindType=F&ForceAction=Y&SV=Full&RS=ITK3.0&VR=1.0" target=_new title="Open In WestLaw">WestLaw</a> | <a href="http://www.lexis.com/xlink?showcidslinks=on&ORIGINATION_CODE=00142&searchtype=get&search=38 Rutgers L. Rec. 112" target=_new title="Open In LexisNexis">LexisNexis</a> | <a href="http://lawrecord.com/files/38_Rutgers_L_Rec_112.pdf" target=_new>PDF</a></span>
The short essay that follows has a very modest ambition. I want to explain why I have difficulty understanding a common motif in discussions of the moral status of criminal punishment. The goal is to stimulate other, more acute scholars to dispel the confusion and clarify the concept that is giving me such trouble.

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			<excerpt-encoded><![CDATA[]]></excerpt-encoded>
			<wp-post_id>480</wp-post_id>
			<wp-post_date>2011-06-07 15:38:43</wp-post_date>
			<wp-post_date_gmt>2011-06-07 22:38:43</wp-post_date_gmt>
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