The Rutgers Law Record | The First Digital Law Journal

BRINGING INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS TO THE 21ST CENTURY: THE POWER OF AI-BASED COMPLIANCE PLATFORMS

Posted on May 13, 2025 by Alicia Grana

52 Rutgers L. Rec. 192 (2025) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

Before the 21st century, Martha Stewart was synonymous with homemaking, cooking, and entertaining. Now, she is more commonly associated with courtroom proceedings, incarceration, and stepping down as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). In December 2001, Stewart sold 3,928 shares of ImClone stock just a day before the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) announced its decision not to review ImClone’s application for a new cancer drug, Erbitux[1], which caused ImClone’s stock price to plummet.[2]

Stewart became embroiled in controversy when she sold her ImClone shares subsequent to receiving insider information from her broker, Peter Bacanovic.[3] Bacanovic allegedly disclosed to Stewart that ImClone’s CEO, Sam Waksal, was divesting his shares due to the FDA’s ruling.[4] Upon receiving this information from Bacanovic, Stewart promptly liquidated all her shares.[5] Authorities charged both Stewart and Bacanovic with multiple crimes, including securities fraud, obstruction of justice, and making false statements.[6] In 2004, the Southern District Court of New York found her guilty of obstruction of justice, making false statements, and conspiracy.[7] The court sentenced her to five months in prison, five months of home confinement, and two years of probation.[8] Additionally, she faced personal and professional consequences, including resigning as CEO of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia[9] and being banned from serving as a director, CEO, or any other officer of a public company for five years.[10] This case raised awareness about the importance of ethical behavior and transparency in financial markets, particularly with insider trading.[11]

Although many doubt that Stewart is completely innocent, the scandal did engender critics to attack the gray areas in insider trading regulations.[12] Rosemary Fanelli, Managing Director and Chief Regulatory Strategist at Duff & Phelps Investment Management, argued that the current regulations are confusing, ambiguous, and “so contradictory that questions of constitutionality are legitimate.”[13] Particularly, existing law lacks clear definition regarding to whom the law applies, the type of information that must be possessed, and the kind of behavior that is prohibited.[14] According to Fanelli, the vague wording of the law suggests that if a woman is advised by her broker to sell a particular stock after indirectly receiving a message from the company’s CEO, without ever directly communicating with him, it would not constitute insider trading violations.[15] Given that this was the situation with Stewart, there is definitely cause for concern.[16]

Insider trading is estimated to occur at least four times more frequently than what regulators manage to detect.[17] Specifically, estimates suggest that insider trading takes place in approximately one out of every five mergers and acquisitions and one out of every twenty quarterly earnings announcements.[18] These statistics are disturbing because insider trading undermines the fairness and integrity of financial markets. When individuals use non-public information to gain an unfair advantage in trading, it erodes trust in the system and can lead to an uneven playing field for investors.[19] This can ultimately discourage people from participating in the market, hindering its overall functionality.[20] In other words, addressing insider trading is important for investor confidence.[21] This confidence contributes to the overall stability and attractiveness of financial markets.[22]

Even though insider trading regulation aims to prevent unfair advantages in the financial markets by prohibiting the use of material, nonpublic information for trading purposes, as mentioned previously, there are several gray areas.[23] These gray areas include ambiguities in defining what constitutes insider trading, what information is material, and what information is nonpublic.[24] Thus, this article proposes to address the uncertainties in insider trading regulation by introducing an innovative solution: an Artificial Intelligence (“AI”)-Based Compliance Platform. By providing clearer insights into what constitutes insider trading, this AI-powered platform promises to bring much-needed clarity and confidence to the enforcement of insider trading regulations.[25]

Part II of this article provides a background on insider trading regulations and the challenges posed by ambiguity and lack of clarity in defining materiality and nonpublic information. Part III discusses scholars’ proposed solutions to the shortcomings of insider trading regulations, such as clearer definitions and precise materiality guidance. While these proposals offer valuable insights, they will not comprehensively solve the intricate challenges of detecting and preventing insider trading in today’s financial landscape. Part IV proposes the creation of an AI-Based Compliance Platform to address the shortcomings of earlier proposals aimed at aiding companies and individuals in adhering to insider trading regulations. For example, the Platform would leverage AI algorithms trained on ethical principles and legal frameworks to provide proactive guidance and monitoring of insider trading activities, ensuring alignment with recognized standards of ethical conduct and legal compliance. Part V concludes by emphasizing how current regulations on insider trading face challenges in deterring and prosecuting offenders due to persistent gray areas. However, the AI-Based Compliance Platform offers a comprehensive solution with real-time monitoring and adaptive capabilities to detect and prevent insider trading effectively. With its dynamic approach, the Platform leads the way towards ensuring trust and accountability in global financial systems.

[1] Lynsey Eidell, Why Did Martha Stewart Go to Prison? A Look Back at Her 2004 Fraud Case, PEOPLE,https://people.com/martha-stewart-fraud-case-prison-sentence-look-back-8550277 (Last updated Nov. 5, 2024, 8:40 AM).

[2] Id. (stating that ImClone’s stock dropped by 16 percent, falling from $60 per share to $46 per share).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. (explaining that when Stewart divested her ownership on December 27, 2001, the shares were liquidated for roughly $227,000, resulting in her gaining a profit of around $51,000 from the transaction).

[6] Eidell, supra note 1.

[7] Eidell, supra note 1

[8] Eidell, supra note 1

[9] A Glance at the History of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, FOX BUSINESS (last updated, Mar. 5, 2016, 5:12 AM), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/a-glance-at-the-history-of-martha-stewart-living-omnimedia (discussing how Martha Stewart established Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia in 1997, where she consolidated her books, magazine, and TV show. For the following thirty years, the company would expand to include home and kitchen products sold at Macy’s Inc., Home Depot, PetSmart, Michaels, and J.C. Penney. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia has recorded annual losses without interruption since 2003, except for the year 2007. In 2015, her company was acquired by Sequential Brands Group for $353 million.).

[10] Eidell, supra note 1 (mentioning how Stewart was also required to pay $195,000 in fines and penalties).

[11] Eidell, supra note 1.

[12] See Rosemary Fanelli, 50 Trades Of Grey: The Pain Of Insider Trading, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2017, 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rosemaryfanelli/2017/04/07/50-trades-of-grey/?sh=7247a271640f.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. (noting that due to the ambiguity of the regulations, individuals are plagued with fear and confusion, often leaving the true wrongdoers unchecked).

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] How much insider trading really happens in US stock markets?, U. of Tech. Sydney (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.uts.edu.au/news/business-law/how-much-insider-trading-really-happens-us-stock-markets.

[18] Id.

[19] James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclosure, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1134, 1174 (2018); Reed Harasimowicz, Nothing New, Man! – The Second Circuit’s Clarification of Insider Trading Liability in United States v. Newman Comes at a Critical Juncture in the Evolution of Insider Trading, 57 B.C. L. REV. 765, 791-92 (2016) (explaining that this line of thinking is called the “parity of information,” or fairness, rationale. The rationale asserts that federal securities laws should establish a system ensuring equal access to information in the securities market. This parity of information is deemed essential for investors to make informed and rational investment choices.).

[20] Park, supra note 19, at 1174.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should Constitute Illegal Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should Constitute Illegal Insider Information?, 21 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 327 (2016).

[24] See id.; Frank J. Cavico & Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, Insider Trading v. Trading on Inside Information: A Primer for Management, 8 Eur. J. Bus. & Mgmt. 72 (2016).

[25] See Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 23.

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DIGITAL DISSENT: EXAMINING THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CYBERPICKETS

Posted on April 27, 2025 by Kai Allen

52 Rutgers L. Rec. 160 (2025) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

INTRODUCTION

In an era characterized by the pervasive influence of digital technology and the rapid evolution of online social activism, traditional labor disputes and picketing face a period of transformation. This transformation is exemplified by the emergence of cyberpicketing[1], a form of digital protest that leverages the power of the internet to amplify the voices of workers and unions. Methods can include, inter alia, the use of social media campaigns, online petitions, anonymous blogging, whistleblowing, virtual demonstrations, email initiatives, digital boycotts, and participation in online forums[2]. The legal community needs to interpret and adapt traditional labor laws to address the issues raised by cyberpicketing.

Whether cyberpickets will constitute a legitimate and long-term form of labor activism [3] in the digital age depends on the establishment of formal regulations on their use and limitations. This note will analyze relevant National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) regulations and case law, labor union activity, legislative developments, and scholarly discourse. [4]By focusing on the legal challenges posed by cyberpicketing, this note seeks to offer insights into potential avenues for regulatory reform and judicial interpretation. The aim is to balance both the right to labor activism and the right of employers to defend themselves against damaging actions by employees.[5] And in doing so connect the broader principles of our established institutional frameworks with digital protest, ensuring that the digital era’s innovations do not come at the expense of fundamental legal values.

This paper will be divided into five parts. First, in Part II I will examine the transformation of picketing from traditional street demonstrations to the digital realm and seek to align cyberpicketing with any other form of picketing. Next, Part III discusses the malicious intentions prevalent in cyberspace, highlighting the potential legal ramifications. Parts IV and V of the note examine how statutes and existing case law provide a legal framework for surrounding cyberpicketing activities. Part VI explores the conflicting interests of employers and employees with respect to cyberpicketing. Additionally, it analyzes various responses by employers to cyberpicketing incidents and considers potential regulatory reforms aimed at balancing the interests of both parties. Overall, this comprehensive exploration provides insights into the legal, ethical, and practical implications of cyberpicketing, offering perspectives for policymakers, legal practitioners, and scholars alike.

[1] A cyberpicket refers to a digital form of protest or collective action initiated by employees toward their employer, aimed at expressing concerns, promoting better workplace conditions, and addressing labor-related issues. See Cyberpicketing to Data Aggregation (Technology Terms), What-When-How, https://what-when-how.com/technology-terms/cyberpicketing-to-data-aggregation-technology-terms/ (Mar. 9, 2013).

[2] Id.

[3] Long-term forms of labor activism refer to sustained, organized efforts by workers and labor groups to advocate for improved working conditions, wages, and labor rights over extended periods. These efforts often include unionization, collective bargaining, strategic litigation, policy advocacy, and public campaigns aimed at systemic change. See generally Ruth Milkman, L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor Movement 2–3 (Russell Sage Found. 2006).

[4] The NLRB, established in 1935, operates as an autonomous federal entity tasked with protecting employees’ rights. These rights include the ability to organize, collaborate for improved working conditions, decide on representation for collective bargaining negotiations with employers, or opt out of such activities. The NLRB administers and enforces the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), reflecting the need for consistency and adjudication in interactions between laborers and employers. Similarly, the primary purpose of the NLRA is to protect the rights of employees and employers, encourage collective bargaining, and safeguard the rights of employees to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. See About NLRB: Who We Are, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 27, 2025).

[5] In sum, this note argues that our established institutional frameworks must ensure that the digital era’s innovations do not come at the expense of fundamental legal values.

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THE TWO WORST JUSTICES: WHAT MAKES A BAD SUPREME COURT JUDGE?

Posted on January 30, 2025 by David Crump

52 Rutgers L. Rec. 109 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

INTRODUCTION

There have been criticisms of Supreme Court Justices of the remote past; many denunciations, in fact. Just as an example, Chief Justice Roger Taney, the author of the Dred Scott decision, came to be hated by slavery abolitionists.[1] The reason may have been the holding: that although Scott was a free man, he was still enslaved, an idea repugnant today and strongly disliked at the time.[2] Or it may have been the reasoning, which was to the effect that as a former slave, Scott was mere “property.” Or it might have been the impact of the decision on the Civil War.[3] And commentators have added other candidates for worst justice of all time, including Justices McReynolds, Moore, and Chase.[4]

But this article is about two modern justices. The two worst, in this author’s judgment. This judgment, of course, demands a foundation in principles that are independent of the outcomes of the decisions the justices made. The criteria this article employs are four: how well the reasoning stands up to criticism, how well the justices have been able to recognize and deal respectfully with opposing views, whether they have avoided egotism and idiosyncratic preferences, and how the decisions that are the aftermath of the opinions have worked out.[5]

To end the suspense, let me disclose at this point that the two candidates here are Justices Blackmun and Scalia. This conclusion may surprise many people, especially those who are accustomed to seeing Justice Scalia as brilliant.[6] The ranking, however, is assigned independently of the outcomes of the justices’ opinions.

Part I of this article covers Justice Blackmun. Subpart A concerns itself with what has been called the justice’s “other wrong decision”[7]: his profoundly misdirected baseball-antitrust opinion. Then, subpart B considers his abortion opinions. A third subpart, C, concerns a decision that has not elicited the controversy it should have, his child-neglect-due-process decision, which refuses to consider whether a child has any interest in termination of parental rights after being neglected.

Part II is about Justice Scalia. Subpart A covers the fallout from his Confrontation Clause opinions, which begin with weak reasoning and which have tied the Court in knots. Subpart B evaluates these opinions and their aftermath. Subpart C concerns Justice Scalia’s opposition to the Court’s decision upholding the Sentencing Commission, in which his rhetoric was inappropriate.

* A.B. Harvard University 1966; J.D. University of Texas 1969. John B. Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston.

[1] https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/dred-scott-case.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] See https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/supreme-court/who-are-the-worst-supreme-court-justices-of-all-time.

[5] See, infra, e.g., Pt. I(B)(9) of this article (applying these criteria to Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe v. Wade).

[6] See Meghan J. Ryan, Justice Scalia’s Bottom-Up Approach to Shaping the Law, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 297, 313-14 (2016).

[7] See infra Pt. I of this article (quoting source supporting this assertion).

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HYBRID RIGHTS IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT: FACT OR FICTION?

Posted on January 28, 2025 by Julianna Scofield

52 Rutgers L. Rec. 80 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

INTRODUCTION

In 2023, the American Library Association reported a total of 695 attempts by the public to “censor library materials and services.”[1] Within these 695 attempts to ban or restrict library materials, “1,915 unique titles were targeted for censorship” while “3,293 total titles were targeted for censorship.”[2] States within the Fourth Circuit accounted for 55 attempts to censor materials, with 589 total titles targeted for censorship.[3] These attempts have been finding their way into school districts, where parents are requesting to opt out their children from lessons with topics like gender identity, sexuality, and race with varying degrees of success.[4] Picture books with LGBTQ characters were overwhelmingly targeted in children’s book challenges with the main reason for wanting books removed that challengers found discussion of LGBTQ characters and their lives to be objectionable, and not appropriate for children.[5] Parents will voice their disagreement with school curriculum and literature choices by stating their child’s exposure to “inappropriate” topics run afoul of a parent’s right to decide what their child should be exposed to (parental rights) and the family’s religious beliefs and practices.[6]

Parents brought a challenge against a Maryland school district for violating their parental rights and free exercise rights when the school district implemented a diverse reading curriculum containing children’s books featuring LGBTQ characters without providing parents an option to opt their children out of the curriculum.[7] The combination of a parental rights and free exercise claim presents the Maryland District Court with the opportunity to analyze what is known as a hybrid rights claim. The Fourth Circuit, which contains the Maryland District Court, does not presently have a method to analyze hybrid rights claims while other circuits have developed frameworks to analyze these claims.[8] This paper will discuss (1) the emergence of a hybrid rights case in the Fourth Circuit; Mahmoud v. McKnight; (2) the origin of the hybrid rights theory and approaches other Circuit Courts have taken when analyzing hybrid rights cases; (3) and the best approach for the Fourth Circuit to take, seeing as the Fourth Circuit currently looks to other circuit courts for persuasive authority on hybrid rights cases. When considering how to analyze a hybrid rights claim, the current approaches pose more drawbacks than benefits. Some approaches could be combined or adapted in order to achieve a more realistic or comprehensible outcome, but the best approach is likely to eschew a hybrid rights analysis and just consider each individual claim on its own merits as the first approach does.

[1] Sareen Habeshian, Attempts to ban books at public libraries surge at record levels, Axios (Sept. 22, 2023), https://www.axios.com/2023/09/22/book-bans-libraries-surge.

[2] Book Ban Data, Banned and Challenged Books https://www.ala.org/advocacy/bbooks/book-ban-data

[https://web.archive.org/web/20240912135200/https://www.ala.org/bbooks/book-ban-data]

(last visited Nov. 8, 2023).

[3] Book Ban Data, supra note 2 (Maryland accounted for 10 censorship attempts covering 66 titles, Virginia accounted for 14 attempts covering 356 titles, West Virginia accounted for 1 attempt covering 3 titles, North Carolina accounted for 18 attempts coveriBook Ban Data,

[4] See Julia Shapero, Judge rejects Maryland parents’ motion to keep kids out of lessons with LGBTQ books, Hill (Aug. 25, 2023), https://thehill.com/homenews/education/4171618-judge-rejects-maryland-parents-motion-to-keep-kids-out-of-lessons-with-lgbtq-bSee Julia Shapero; see also Hannan Adely, Can parents opt out of New Jersey’s LGBTQ curriculum law?, Northjersey.com, June 26, 2019), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/education/2019/06/26/teaching-lgbtq-in-schools-can-nj-parents-opt-out/1549151001 ; see also Margaret Barthel, Virginia Finalizing Policy Allowing Parents to Opt Out of Sexually Explicit Content in Schools, dcist.com (Aug. 3, 2022), https://dcist.com/story/22/08/03/virginia-schools-explicit-content-lgbtq-books/; see also Destinee Patterson, NC school districts adjust to controversial new ‘Parents’ Bill of Rights’ law, WRAL News (Oct. 5, 2023), https://www.wral.com/story/nc-school-districts-adjust-to-controversial-new-parents-bill-of-rights-law/21083428/.

[5] Hannah Natanson, ‘Racist,’ ‘grooming’: Why parents are trying to ban so many picture books, Wash. Post (July 12, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2023/07/12/grooming-racist-why-adults-are-waging-war-childrens-picture-books-or-insidHannah Natanso

[6] Mahmoud v. McKnight, 688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 276 (D. Md. 2023), aff’d, 102 F.4th 191 (4th Cir. 2024).

[7] Id. at 271, 301.

[8] Id. at 304-306.

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TOWARDS A NEXTGEN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

Posted on January 17, 2025 by Dawn Figueiras

52 Rutgers L. Rec. 28 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

INTRODUCTION

As the third-smallest law school in the nation,^[1] Appalachian School of Law (“ASL”) is probably not the first law school to come to mind when thinking of cutting-edge, innovative curricular and pedagogical changes in legal education. Yet, ASL has long prided itself on its agility and ability to rapidly respond to outside forces. In February, 2022, when the American Bar Association (“ABA”) revised Standard 303(b) on development of a professional identity and Standard 303(c) on educating law students on bias, cross-cultural competency, and racism, ASL reacted quickly by developing and adopting its Implementation Plan before the beginning of the next term.[2]^{,^[3]} An article on ASL’s approved Implementation Plan was the first entry published on the University of St. Thomas School of Law’s Holloran Center[4] Professional Identity Implementation Blog on August 22, 2022.^[5] A year later, ASL reported on its progress in executing its Implementation Plan.^[6]

So, when the National Conference of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”) Board of Trustees approved its Testing Task Force’s recommendation^[7] for the five-year implementation of a completely revised bar examination, ASL didn’t hesitate to roll up its sleeves and get to work on examining its entire curriculum and making necessary changes to prepare its students for the “NextGen Bar Exam.” To this author’s knowledge, although a few articles have addressed it, no other law school has published a NextGen Curriculum.[8] This article aims to provide law school faculty and administrators with details on how ASL achieved its goal of putting into place a NextGen Curriculum for the entering Class of 2027.

Section A of this article will briefly review the development of the NextGen Bar Exam and its differences from the Uniform Bar Exam. Section B will discuss ASL’s self-assessment process for ascertaining its current curriculum’s sufficiency for the NextGen Bar Exam. Section C will examine ASL’s method in analyzing its self-assessment results to revise its curriculum to meet the new challenges, and will compare ASL’s existing and newly-revised NextGen curricula. Section D looks forward to how ASL will continue to assess the results of the curricular changes and fine-tune the program of legal education.

[1] ASL had a full-time enrollment of 161 students according to U.S. News & World Report’s 2024 Best Law Schools rankings. Only the law schools at University of the District of Columbia (Clarke), with 125 full-time students, and Western Michigan University (Cooley), with 154 full-time students, are smaller. See 2024 Best Law Schools, U.S. News & World Rep., https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings?_sort=enrollment-asc (last visited Dec. 19, 2024).

[2] See Report to the House of Delegates, Resolution (Feb. 2022), Amer. Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2022/02/midyear-hod-resolutions/300.pdf.

[3] See Dawn Figueiras, One Law School’s Faculty-Approved Implementation Plan for Complying with the ABA’s

Revised Standards 303(b) and 303(c), Univ. St. Thomas: Holloran Ctr. Pro. Identity Impl. Blog (August 22, 2022), https://blogs.stthomas.edu/holloran-center/implementation-plan/.

[4] The Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership at the University of St. Thomas School of Law has focused on curriculum development and the professional formation of law students since its founding in 2006. Its Professional Identity Formation Blog has become one of the nation’s major sources for discussion and reflection upon professional identity formation for law students. See Univ. St. Thomas: Holloran Ctr. for Ethical Leadership, https:/law.stthomas.edu/about/centers-institutes/holloran-center/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2024).

[5] See Figueiras, supra note 4.

[6] See Dawn Figueiras, One Year Later: An Update on One Law School’s Faculty-Approved Implementation Plan, Univ. St. Thomas: Holloran Ctr. Pro. Identity Impl. Blog (July 26, 2023), https://blogs.stthomas.edu/holloran-center/one-year-later-an-update-on-one-law-schools-faculty-approved-implementation-plan.

[7] See NCBE Board of Trustees Votes to Approve Testing Task Force Recommendations, Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.ncbex.org/news-resources/ncbe-board-trustees-votes-approve-testing-task-force-recommendations.

[8] See Melissa Shultz, Professor, Please Help Me Pass the Bar Exam: #NEXTGENBAR2026, 71 J. of Legal Educ. 141, 169 (Fall 2021), https://jle.aals.org/home/vol71/iss1/13/ (confirming that law schools across the country will need to “grapple with the substantial changes … and begin to critically assess how their curricula and assessments need to be modified in advance of the [NextGen Bar Exam]”).

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A BRIDGE TOO FAR: SECTION 3 AFTER TRUMP V. ANDERSON

Posted on December 30, 2024 by Daniel P. Malone

52 Rutgers L. Rec. 1 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

I. INTRODUCTION

After the 2020 presidential election, then-President Donald Trump engaged in a monthslong legal and social media campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the election.[1] On January 6, 2021, thousands of armed rioters attacked the U.S. Capitol in a failed attempt to stop Congress’s certification of the 2020 presidential election.[2] In the fallout of the attack, Donald Trump was impeached by the House of Representatives for incitement of insurrection.[3] At the same time, political and legal commentators began speculating whether the Disqualification Clause of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment would bar Donald Trump from seeking office again.[4] Donald Trump was eventually acquitted by the Senate[5] but the cloud of disqualification under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment lingered after he left office.[6]

This would have been historically unprecedented. Beyond the initial flurry of litigation in the wake of the Civil War, the Disqualification Clause in Section 3 had only been used once since the end of Reconstruction to remove someone from federal office.[7] Previously derided as a “forgotten”[8] and “vestigial”[9] part of the Constitution, Section 3 received new life in the aftermath of January 6. Section 3 has been used as the foundation for lawsuits against officials in six states[10] and was explicitly cited by a court to justify removal from office of a county commissioner in New Mexico.[11] The clause’s timeliness and relevance only grew since mid-2023 when two law professors, William Blaude and Michael Paulsen, alleged that the clause, by operation of law, automatically disqualified Donald Trump from seeking the presidency again.[12] Others disagree.[13]

In late 2023, the threat of disqualification was realized when Donald Trump was disqualified from the Colorado presidential primary under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Colorado Supreme Court, acting under a Colorado state law that allowed voters to petition the secretary of state to keep constitutionally ineligible candidates off of the ballot.[14] The Supreme Court reversed that decision on March 4, 2024, holding that the States could not exercise discretionary judgment on the constitutional qualifications of presidential candidates.[15] But the Court then went further, broadening their ruling and holding that Section 3 is inoperative against would-be federal officeholders unless specifically given life by Congress.[16] And while the Court was unanimous in its holding that the States are powerless to enforce Section 3, the Court’s disembowelment of that Section, reasoning that Section 5 enforcement legislation was “critical” to Section 3’s application, produced a much more controversial 5-4 result.[17]

[1] H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 210-14 (2022).

[2] Id. at 76-77.

[3] H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).

[4] See Deepak Gupta & Brian Beutler, Opinion, Impeachment Isn’t the Only Option Against Trump, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/opinion/Trump-impeachment-disqualification.html; see also Noah Feldman, Opinion, Trump’s 2024 Hopes Just Crashed Into the 14th Amendment, Bloomberg (Jan. 11, 2021, 3:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2021-01-11/trump-2024-president-may-be-ineligible-after-u-s-capitol-riot; see also Lyle Denniston, Is 14th Amendment Sec. 3 a Dead Letter?, Lyle Denniston L. News (Jan. 10, 2021), https://lyldenlawnews.com/2021/01/10/is-14th-amendment-sec-3-a-dead-letter/

[5] 167 Cong. Rec. S733 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021).

[6] Roger Parloff, After the Cawthorn Ruling, Can Trump Be Saved From Section 3 of the 14th Amendment?, Lawfare (June 7, 2022, 1:32 PM), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/after-cawthorn-ruling-can-trump-be-saved-section-3-14th-amendment.

[7] Marcy Kahn, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report by the Task Force on the Rule of Law on Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution – The Disqualification Clause 3 (2022) [hereinafter NYC Bar Report].

[8] Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution of Memory, 62 St. Louis U. L.J. 639, 639-40 (2018).

[9] Gerard N. Magliocca, Amnesty and Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 Const. Comment. 87, 87 (2021).

[10] NYC Bar Report, supra Note 8, at 4-13.

[11] See New Mexico ex rel. White v. Griffin, No. D-101-CV-2022-00473, 2022 N.M. Dist. LEXIS 1, *67-69 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 2022).

[12] See Isaac Chotiner, The Constitutional Case for Barring Trump from the Presidency, New Yorker (Aug. 23, 2023), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-constitutional-case-for-barring-trump-from-the-presidency; see also Matt Ford, The Conservative Legal Roadmap to Disqualify Trump from Office, New Republic (Aug. 13, 2023), https://newrepublic.com/article/174977/baude-paulsen-trump-14th-amendment.

[13] Josh Blackman & Seth B. Tillman, Sweeping and Forcing the President into Section 3, 28 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. (2024).

[14] Anderson v. Griswold, 2023 CO 63, ¶ 257, 543 P.3d 283 (Colo. 2023), rev’d sub nom Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024) (per curiam).

[15] Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, 114-15 (2024) (per curiam).

[16] Id. at 104-06.

[17] Id. at 117-18 (Barrett, J., concurring); see also, id. at 121 (Sotomayor, S., Kagan, E., and Jackson, JJ., concurring).

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AN “ASSEMBLAGE” OF OPINIONS: HOW THE COUNTERPOINT OF THE ROBERTS COURT’S SECOND AMENDMENT CASES FIXED INADVERTENCIES IN JOHN MARSHALL’S TREASON DOCTRINE

Posted on July 28, 2024 by Christian Ketter

51 Rutgers L. Rec. 200 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

INTRODUCTION: “ASSEMBLAGE”

A word not defined elsewhere in a source takes its meaning from the context in which it is used.^5[1] But when the context of a word changes, so does its meaning. Chief Justice John G. Roberts reasoned on behalf of the Court in King v. Burwell (the second Obamacare case) that “oftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”[2]

In this context, the Constitution’s Treason Clause plainly provides only two types of treason—levying of war and aiding of the enemy.[3] It states: “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”[4] Because treason is the sole crime that was viewed with such importance, so as to be included in America’s Constitution, its meaning is uniquely and particularly important.[5] Thus, its definition must be precise and specific. And this must be the case for all applications thereof.

When, however, Chief Justice John Marshall addressed the functions of treason, pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, he inserted a curious word into the mix, which no Court addressing treason has analyzed since—“assemblage.” In its context, he wrote, “[t]o constitute a levying of war, there must be an assemblage of persons for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose.”[6] But Marshall’s term of art, “an assemblage of persons,” is not within the text of the Treason Clause. This, thus, presents the question as to what effect, if any, Marshall’s surplusage had on treason charges for levying war.

This article, therefore, addresses if and when treason is committed by one party—acting alone—whether the Treason Clause permits such prosecution and whether John Marshall’s “assemblage” in his treason opinions poses an obstacle thereto. While other avenues of federal charges remain, treason is seldom used.[7] Marshall’s concept of the “assemblage of persons” suggests a parallel as to the criminal procedure common law concept of conspiracy, wherein “two or more persons,” via joint efforts, commit an act that is unlawful or leads to an unlawful result.[8] Conspiracy is, thus, what could be called a “plus one” crime. In light of Marshall’s interpretation, evidently, treason can also. But because that is not what Article III, Section 3 states, what follows is an analysis of the landmark cases for the Treason Clause and Second Amendment—“look[ing] at the cases from the bottom up rather than the top down.”[9]

That analysis reveals that the Roberts Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment has changed the focus from militia dependent to individual dependent.[10] Dual analysis of these discrete aspects of the Constitution reveals a complementary nature in which the contemporaneous individual interpretations of the Second Amendment surmounted Marshall’s textual deviations to the Treason Clause. This article posits that the elements of treason inadvertently changed under the Marshall Court but fortuitously found course-correction with the Roberts Court’s twenty-first century individualization of the Second Amendment.

[1] See generally Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 375 (1816) (Story, J., writing, “[l]anguage is essentially defective in precision; more so than those are aware of who are not in the habit of subjecting it to philological analysis. . . The language of the framers of the constitution . . . assumes, as a postulate, that wherever power is given it will be used or at least used, as far as the interests of the American people require it, if not from the natural proneness of man to the exercise of power, at least from a sense of duty, and the obligation of an oath.”); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1999) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“It is so utterly clear in normal usage that [the word] ‘intent’ does not include conditional intent, that only an accepted convention in the criminal law could give the word a different meaning”); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 532 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[w]hen a word has more than one meaning, the meaning that is intended is often made clear by the context in which the word is used.”); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001) (Thomas, J., writing, “We do not, however, construe the meaning of statutory terms in a vacuum.”); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 408 (2011) (Thomas, J., writing on behalf of the Court, “we must consider the provision’s ‘entire text,’ read as an ‘integrated whole.’”).

[2] King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015).

[3] U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.

[4] Id.

[5] See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 265 (1952) (“[T]reason—the one crime deemed grave enough for definition in our Constitution itself—requires not only the duly witnessed overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy but also the mental element of disloyalty or adherence to the enemy.”).

[6] Bollman, 8 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added); Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 89 (emphasis added).

[7] See generally B. Mitchell Simpson, III, Treason and Terror: A Toxic Brew, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2018) (surmising “[e]ven though the Constitution prevents Congress from expanding the definition of treason by labeling other acts as treason, Congress may decide that other acts that could have been reasonably considered treasonous are felonies, and provide severe penalties for committing them.”). Professor Simpson also encourages, “[t]he modern state representing contemporary society not only has the right, but also the duty to enforce the loyalty of its members and those who enjoy its protection . . . Treason is still a valid legal tool and it should be used.”. Id. at 53.

[8] HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M.A., A DICTIONARY OF LAW: DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN; INCLUDING THE PRINCIPAL TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND COMMERCIAL LAW; WITH A COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS AND NUMEROUS SELECT TITLES FROM THE CIVIL LAW AND OTHER FOREIGN SYSTEMS 257 (1st ed. 1891) (“In criminal law a combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act, or some act which is innocent in itself, but becomes unlawful when concerted action of the conspirators, or for the purpose of using criminal or unlawful means to the commission of an act not in itself unlawful.”).

[9] Adam Liptak , supra note 4.

[10] New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 22 (2022).

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LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT IN CORPORATE INNOVATION AND WELFARE ENHANCEMENT

Posted on April 22, 2024 by Mizuki Hashiguchi

51 Rutgers L. Rec. 187 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

I. INTRODUCTION

“A COPYRIGHT WILL PROTECT YOU FROM PIRATES. And make you a fortune. If you have a PLAY, SKETCH, PHOTO, ACT, SONG or BOOK that is worth anything, you should copyright it. Don’t take chances when you can secure our services at small cost . . . .”¹ This is an excerpt from an advertisement in 1906 by Columbia Copyright & Patent Co. Inc.² Economic principles of wealth maximization³, risk aversion⁴, and cost-benefit analysis⁵ emanate from this advertisement urging creators to seek copyright protection.

Copyright protects original works of creative expression.⁶ Copyright owners have the exclusive right to reproduce, publicly perform, or display the copyrighted work, create derivative works from the copyrighted work, and distribute copies of the copyrighted work.⁷ Edwin C. Hettinger reports that most copyrights are owned by institutions including corporations.⁸ Without copyright protection, many companies are threatened by competitors who copy the companies’ creative works at low cost and sell the copies at reduced prices.⁹

Economic principles underlie the legal protection of copyright and corporations’ strategic plans for innovation. More than a century after Columbia Copyright & Patent Company’s advertisement in 1906, with the advent of novel technologies, analysis in law and economics remains vital in the evaluation of copyright policies for public welfare and corporate initiatives for innovation.

This article first analyzes concepts of law and economics in the welfare justification of copyright (I). This article then applies this examination to critique the United States Supreme Court’s adjudication of a corporation’s initiative to provide the public with copyrighted audiovisual content through innovative technology (II).

¹ Advertisement for Columbia Copyright & Patent Company from The New York Clipper, Nov. 3, 1906, Library of Congress, United States of America, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/bobhope/vaude.html#obj036 (last visited Mar. 29, 2024).

² Id.

³ Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUDS. 103, 119 (1979).

⁴ 8.1 Risk Aversion and the Allocation of Risk, HARV. UNIV., https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/LawEconomics/risk.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2024).

⁵ PWC, UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INTRODUCING A ‘FAIR USE’ EXCEPTION 14-15 (2016).

⁶ Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 32 (1989).

⁷ Id. at 34.

⁸ See id. at 46.

⁹ Id. at 47; see also Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, and S. 32 Before the Subcomm. of Cts., C.L. & the Admin. of Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 720 (1985) (referencing section titled “Tough to Get Compensation,” discussing movie-producing corporations’ difficulty in obtaining compensation in the face of individuals and entities who copy movies on cassettes at low cost).

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CRITICAL RACE THEORY EXPLAINED; BOOK REVIEW OF VICTOR RAY, ON CRITICAL RACE THEORY: WHY IT MATTERS AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (RANDOM HOUSE (2022) 209 PP.)

Posted on April 20, 2024 by André LeDuc

51 Rutgers L. Rec. 171 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

I. INTRODUCTION

Victor Ray’s new book, On Critical Race Theory, offers non-specialists the best available introduction to critical race theory. Before its publication, the standard introductions have been the classic works by legal scholars Kimberlé Crenshaw and by Richard Delgado.¹ They were largely intended for legal theorists and academics; they had become somewhat dated, on the one hand, by the burgeoning application of the insights of critical race theory outside the law, and by the increasing controversy about critical race theory in the broader political and public discourse. Ray, a sociologist and an advocate of critical race theory, expressly tries to fill this gap, both explaining the expanding scope of critical race theory and defending it against its critics. Ray writes clearly and precisely about sometimes complex arguments. As a result, Critical Race Theory performs these two missions admirably.

Ray’s book is a simple, almost journalistic, contribution to the defense of critical race theory. That’s not a weakness; just such a work is what our public, political discourse requires. As Ray notes, his first draft was written in “a three-month sprint.” (p. 125) The book should be judged on this basis, rather than as a more deliberative assessment of the theory and its limitations. From this perspective, it’s hardly fair to call out omissions that a reviewer might find significant in what is intentionally and self-consciously only a survey of an expansive, multi-disciplinary project. Readers will undoubtedly find their own gaps. Ray’s book offers a defense of critical race theory. It doesn’t pause to expressly acknowledge any substantive or rhetorical overstatement by critical race theory’s advocates. There are necessarily trade-offs in such an expedited publication schedule, both in the scope and the depth of the resulting product. In general, the pay-off in accessibility and timeliness that Critical Race Theory achieves more than outweighs these costs.

¹ See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012); KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1996).

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REINFORCING GLOBAL BIODEFENSE: THE CASE FOR AMENDING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEGITIMACY

Posted on April 18, 2024 by Ryan Houser

51 Rutgers L. Rec. 137 (2024) | WestLaw | LexisNexis | PDF

I. INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic brought the world to a standstill, infecting millions, and causing widespread economic and social disruption. The pandemic not only highlighted the importance of robust public health systems and emergency preparedness, but also brought to light the increasing threat of biological weapons. The potential for malevolent actors to use biological agents as weapons of mass destruction has been a concern for decades, but the COVID-19 pandemic has shown how devastating such an attack could be. Biological weapons involve the distribution of pathogens or poisons that can cause harm or death to living beings, including humans, animals, and plants.¹ Biological weapons are extremely dangerous and can spread easily from person to person. If used intentionally, they could have catastrophic consequences, including global spread of diseases beyond national borders, food shortages, environmental disasters, economic devastation, and widespread panic and mistrust. The aftermath of such an event would not only result in loss of lives but also impact the entire global population with far-reaching effects. There is a fifty-one-year-old international treaty that established the prevention of biological weapon usage. “In 1972, a historic attempt to create the world’s first international legal regime banning the development and possession of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction culminated in the drafting of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).”² The BWC “reflects a comprehensive repudiation of the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weaponry.”³ Despite its symbolic importance as a norm creating treaty, the absence of verification and enforcement provisions has rendered it “merely a paper agreement that could easily be circumvented.”⁴

The BWC is the cornerstone of the biological weapons disarmament regime, but the treaty is having difficulty keeping up with changing threats due to its decision-making process and geopolitics. Fundamentally flawed, the BWC is “crippled by key compromises made by the great powers in pursuit of various self-interested security objectives in the context of the Cold War.”⁵ In November 2022, over two years after the widescale emergence of COVID-19, the international community met to review the BWC for the ninth time. In early 2022, the prospects for strengthening the BWC were the best they had been in years as China, Russia, and the United States had articulated individual plans that reflected enough common ground to craft a workable compromise.⁶ This cautious optimism around the BWC’s improvement prospects were spoiled by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. The illegal aggression of Russia undermined the rules-based international order that the BWC is intertwined with. As part of the invasion, Russia also deliberately fabricated allegations levied against Ukraine, the United States, and other partners⁷ which “stigmatizes and politicizes biosafety, biosecurity, and cooperative public health and life sciences research to the detriment of not just Ukraine, but global health security overall.”⁸ Efforts to misrepresent or undermine legitimate biosafety and biosecurity research and capacity building weaken the BWC and undermine international cooperation for peaceful purposes.

Russia failed to garner support for its allegations in UN Security Council meetings in March and May of 2022 and then in June, Russia invoked Article V of the BWC to force the treaty’s 184 member states to hold a special consultation meeting. While Russia stood largely alone⁹ in the November 2022 UN Security Council meeting it forced, this process highlighted how legitimate processes in treaties and governmental bodies can be turned towards illegitimate ends.¹⁰ The BWC’s durable framework, may be sunsetting soon after its 50th anniversary as it attempts to stay on top of a changing global landscape that includes rapidly evolving capabilities and new actors in the life sciences, as well as disinformation.¹¹ The BWC is based on good faith implementation by state parties as there are no external monitoring measures or oversight of any kind. Compliance is based not on oversight, but the international legal principle of reciprocity and the threat of withdrawal from the Convention. International cooperation, solely based on good faith is likely a fleeting dream. The bad faith hijacking of the legitimate procedures outlined in the BWC by Russia in 2022, suggests that a true, binding cooperation pillar for the BWC may be needed. The concept of a cooperation pillar was first introduced in Article III of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).¹² The NPT pillar was based on the concept of “atoms for peace,” which anticipated that nuclear technology would be crucial for energy production and a cooperative pillar could provide incentives for States that lacked such technology to join the NPT.¹³ The actions of Russia also call into question the legitimacy of international law and the legitimacy of international order, a foundational principle for the BWC and other international treaties which keep the world safe and secure. Arguments for legal reform to improve the BWC are not new, but in a world with eroding international law legitimacy and norms of good faith disappearing, there is a need to reevaluate the legal landscape of the BWC which has laid dormant for over a decade.

The 9th Review Conference, which ended in late 2022, was far from perfect, but it provided “a glimmer of hope in an overall bleak international security environment.”¹⁴ This note calls for an amendment to the Biological Weapons Convention that leverages a cooperation pillar to ensure compliance with the treaty while subsequently enhancing the legitimacy of international law, building upon a slim inertia for positive change. Part I of this paper analyzes the historical context to the creation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the legislative features that frames its current structure. Part II investigates the scope of international law and legitimacy, historically and in the current climate. Section I of Part II analyzes the components of international legitimacy. Next the subpart will define the framework of analysis of international law legitimacy. Section II of Part II investigates the current conflicts of international legitimacy and international law. The final section of Part II will subsequently suggest the principles which can make international law more legitimate. Part III of the note will discuss international institutions and their role in instilling a cooperation pillar for the BWC. The final section of this note, Part IV, will suggest recommendations that will improve the BWC and make it more adaptable to the evolving threats both in the international law and relations space, but also in the rapidly changing landscape of biological threats.

¹ Biological Weapons Convention, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2024).

² Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 271, 271 (2007).

³ Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 482 (1999).

⁴ See Susan Wright, Prospects for Biological Disarmament in the 1990s, 2 TRANSNAT’L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 454 (1992); see also Nicholas A. Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force 1975-85, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 984 (1988) (Sims concludes, “Those who took the British initiative of 1968 [which included strong provisions for verification and complaint investigation] and watered it down into the Convention of 1972 gave the world biological disarmament on the cheap: a disarmament regime of minimal machinery which would cost next to nothing to sustain. It is now painfully evident that these short-term savings have been outweighed by the long-term costs of a regime lacking the means to sustain its credibility in the face of suspicious events which cannot be resolved one way or the other.”).

⁵ Beard, supra note 2, at 271.

⁶ Gregory D. Koblentz & Filippa Lentzos, A Plan B to Strengthen Biosafety and Biosecurity, THINKGLOBALHEALTH (Nov. 15, 2022), https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/plan-b-strengthen-biosafety-and-biosecurity?utm_medium=social_owned&utm_source=tw_tgh.

⁷ Russia made spurious allegations that the United States and other NATO members are violating the treaty by developing biological weapons in Ukraine.

⁸ Ryan Houser et al., Understanding Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine, 21 HEALTH SECURITY 70, 80 (2023).

⁹ Only China supported Russia’s formal accusation that the United States was noncompliant with the BWC.

¹⁰ Yong-Bee Lim et al., Preparing for Twenty-First-Century Bioweapons, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. (Dec. 8, 2022); https://issues.org/bioweapons-biological-weapons-convention-bwc-ngos/.

¹¹ Id.

¹² James Revill & María Garzón Maceda, Options for Article of the Biological Weapons Convention, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RSCH. (Feb. 3, 2022), https://unidir.org/publication/options-article-x-biological-weapons-convention/.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Una Jakob, The 9th Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, PRIF BLOG (Feb. 7, 2023), https://blog.prif.org/2023/02/07/the-9th-review-conference-of-the-biological-weapons-convention/ (citing UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres).

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